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Fears of Europe: USSR, Russia and European Integration
Lara Piccardo
«If we don’t know how to make ourselves bearers of a human and modern ideal 
in a lost and uncertain Europe on the way to go, we are lost and Europe is lost with 
us. In this our old continent, there is a scary ideal vacuum. (...) We must oppose this 
triggering; and the only course of action that opens before us is the preaching of 
the good news. We know what this good news is: it is the idea of freedom against 
intolerance, of cooperation against brute force. Europe that Italy hopes for (…) is not 
a Europe closed to anyone, it is a Europe open to all, a Europe in which men can freely 
assert their conﬂicting ideals and in which the majorities respect the minorities and 
promote the same ends, up to the extreme limit in which they are compatible with the 
existence of the whole community»1.
These words are by Luigi Einaudi: he pronounced that speech in 1947 in front of the 
Italian Constituent Assembly. His words are still current at a time when fear seems to be 
the dominant feeling in Europe. For those who believe in Europe, there is the sense of 
imminent danger for European democracy, because of the advance of Euro-scepticisms 
and sovereignties. In Europe a poison of anger, fear, violence and hatred unfortunately 
winds and an antidote must be found, ensuring that all countries become “producers” 
of knowledge, freedom, solidarity, strong economies, sustainability, and integration.
Nowadays, the fear of immigration is certainly another hot topic. The xenophobic 
rhetoric against migrants and refugees seems to wipe out the most tangible symbol of 
the European construction for the citizens of the participating countries. The Schengen 
agreement was signed in 1985 by Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to progressively eliminate internal border controls 
and introduce freedom of movement. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, with 
the attack on the Twin Towers, the European States adopted the doctrine of “national 
security” on the American model and more and more the borders become matters 
of State security. Consistent with this address, in 2004 the Agency Frontex was born 
in order to keep monitored and controlled access at the border of land and sea to EU 
countries. An intensiﬁcation of these trends occurred in 2012, when more consistent 
migration ﬂows aﬀected the continent. If until that year, there were only two walls built 
on the borders of European countries, both along the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
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Melilla, the barbed wire fence on the border between Greece and Turkey inaugurated 
a new season for the European countries. The walls have sprung up all over Europe, 
fuelled both by the fake news that circulates indiscriminately on social media – which 
now seem to be the main information tool used by citizens – and by the absence of a 
clear political strategy that is able to manage migratory ﬂows and reassure Europeans.
Another fear often cited by anti-Europeans relates to euro, wrongly considered 
responsible for national taxes, economic crisis, inﬂation and unemployment. In twenty 
years, euro has become the currency of 340 million Europeans and 19 Member States, 
including, among others, all the founding countries and 7 of the 13 that joined EU after 
the start of its circulation. Euro directly or indirectly inﬂuences the currency stability of 
60 territories located even outside the borders of the old settlement, involving around 
6.5 % of the world population; it is not by chance that it accounts for 20.1% of global 
foreign exchange reserves2. It is also a popular currency: in twenty years, support for 
the single currency has increased from 71% in the early 2000s to 74% today. Economists 
often remember that inﬂation and ﬁnancing dynamics, incomes and employment are 
tangible signs of its success. Three elements agitate the debate among the “experts”: 
the completion of the banking union; the transformation of the European Stability 
Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund; the establishment of a ﬁnance minister. 
These tools, if adequately designed, could strengthen the capacity of European 
institutions to guarantee the ﬁnancial and economic stability of the whole Union.
According to the Eurobarometer data3, these fears seem to be the most pervasive, 
but certainly, they are not the only ones and change country by country. Becoming 
aware of these fears does not mean justifying the European Union or obliging citizens 
to change their mind. An analysis, or at least an awareness of the short-sightedness of 
those narratives that feed these fears, would go back to thinking about the diﬃculties, 
the failures and the EU’s urgent needs, in order to propose a political agenda as much 
concrete and shared as possible.
This issue of «De Europa» intends to be a small contribution in this direction. It deals 
in particular with another fear, the USSR/Russia, which has historically been a powerful 
factor of aggregation and acceleration of the process of European integration at the 
beginning of the Cold War.
Anti-Russian hatred and resentment has developed over the centuries in diﬀerent 
directions. There was a French Russophobia during the Napoleonic era, a British 
one, which began with the “big game” in Central Asia, and a German one with the 
ﬁght for “living space” in the East. Finally, American Russophobia appeared. It is a 
dynamic synthesis of French liberal-democratic Russophobia and English and German 
imperialist Russophobias4.
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The “red danger” found its lifeblood with the emergence of the category of 
“totalitarianism” from the late 1940s. It would later become a highly abused interpretive 
key to understand the twentieth-century European dictatorships, and it would have 
returned in vogue in the Reagan era, when the Soviet Union would have been identiﬁed 
with the “evil empire”5.
Many of the clichés, or the most evocative and still widespread images (from the 
Cossacks to St. Peter to the child-eating communists, up to the mental and literary 
topos of Siberia) date back to those years. For the older generations, Russia remains 
an irredeemable home of godless, from whom it is the least to be wary. It must be 
added to these Russophobians those who, due to various political motivations or to 
the eﬀects of the strong American inﬂuence, show a clear basic tendency towards 
Moscow. This hostility often ﬂows into the merits, when it takes aim at the whole 
Russian people (continuously confusing Russkij and Rossijskij) or when it took refuge 
in cognitive convenient loopholes (like that never really occurred, the Russian troll) in 
order not to analyse the complexity of reality6.
On the other hand, there are those who look at Russia with manifest fondness. 
Here too, the reasons are very heterogeneous. On the one hand there are those who 
do not feel a particular connection with Moscow but with the form and expression 
of its most visible power, namely Putin or Putinism, Then there is of course the anti-
American component, which in the framework of geopolitics has (re)seen in Moscow 
the most direct and close rival of Washington’s imperial ambitions. But, above all, there 
is a far more widespread aﬃnity between diﬀerent EU countries and Russia, deriving 
from social ties, cultural exchanges and frequent trade contacts in various areas7.
The contributions published in this issue of «De Europa» try to complete the look 
on Russia, as a rival but also as a potential partner of the European Union.
The ﬁrst article deals about the historical relation between Tsarist Russia/USSR and 
Western Europe/Integrated Europe. Since the beginning of the European construction 
process, by focusing on the ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, 
communist authorities did not understand the potential signiﬁcance of the eﬀorts 
of people like Jean Monnet, directed at economic, ﬁnancial, and cultural integration. 
Although the Soviet bloc economy needed economic relations with Western Europe, 
its political rulers rejected the idea of any European federation or confederation on 
the old continent. Even before the birth of the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia had 
always looked to each other with diﬃdence or fear. Speciﬁcally, the geographical and 
identity location of Russia has always suﬀered because of the ambiguity of being a 
border between East and West, between Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, it would be 
misleading to measure the Russian swing between East and West by the yardstick of its 
greater or lesser Europeanization: this view would presuppose an implicit hierarchical 
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relationship between Europe and Russia, of which historians should “estimate” 
progress or involution taking “Russia’s Europeanisation” as a single unit of measure. 
On the contrary, the relationship between Europe – understood in diﬀerent historical 
moments as a geographical reality and/or as European Community/Union – and 
Russia has from time to time been expressed by the Russians in a complex reception 
of European or non-European models. Moreover, Russia looks at this relationship with 
the ambition to be an autonomous driving force because of belief to identify itself 
as the center of the world and not as a periphery. So it is important to analyses how 
Western Europe and Russia, being located within a common geographical area, have 
historically created a web of relationships characterized by attraction and repulsion, 
conditioned for centuries by ideology and power logic and often degenerated into 
contradictions and incompatibility.
Elena Dundovich reﬂects on the fact that, as never before since the days of the 
October Revolution, Russia underwent radical and profound transformations between 
1991 and the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, both from the point of 
view of domestic politics and that of its international projection. In this respect, Yeltsin 
decided to continue the “new course” inaugurated by Gorbachev aimed at improving 
relations with the USA and Europe. In doing so, a major role was played by the will of the 
oligarchs who wanted to have close relations with the West in order to obtain ﬁnancing 
and new opportunities for proﬁt. Between 1991 and 1996, with Andrey Kozyrev as 
Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, the pro-Western policy of the Federation expressed itself with 
greater conviction until approval of the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern 
European countries. It was not so much for this reason that relations began to enter a 
period of crisis as the decision to expand NATO in that direction, a choice that aroused 
harsh criticism in a large part of Russian public opinion and brought Yevgeny Primakov, 
promoter of a less Western-centred policy, to the fore as the new foreign minister.
Sara Tavani analyses EU-Russia security relations. Since the Cold War ending, 
relations between Europe and Russia have progressively lost their sense of direction 
and experienced an ever more complicated phase, especially worrisome in the security 
ﬁeld. In the unstable international system which followed the end of bipolarism, 
Euro-Russian security relations failed to be institutionalised and the European Union 
continued to refer to NATO as its primary security guarantee. This article argues that 
the current East-West European security dialogue raises diﬃculties already faced 
during the Cold War years, as the CSCE negotiation knots demonstrate. Speciﬁcally, 
the central issue remains the unbalanced strategic relationship between the European 
countries and Russia, which still lies unresolved due to the continue lack of a major 
European political and military integration.
Neil Robinson concentrates on Russophobia in oﬃcial Russian political discourse. 
The charge of Russophobia has been made increasingly frequently against Western 
critics of Russia in the last few years. Much of this criticism has been made by Russian 
media and commentators rather than by high oﬃcials of the Russian state. There 
have been several studies of this media use of accusations of Russophobia and it 
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has generally been asserted that the charge of Russophobia is part of a concerted 
propaganda eﬀort by the Russian state. However, there has been little examination 
of the use of Russophobia by top Russian politicians. This article examines the use of 
Russophobia by President Vladimir Putin as well as by top oﬃcials of the Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀairs, and in communiques of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. It ﬁnds that 
there has been only minor changes in the allegations of Russophobia by senior Russian 
politicians. The article looks at why Russophobia became a more prevalent accusation 
in Russian politics generally and at why there has been a diﬀerence in the accusations 
of Russophobia made by the media and in oﬃcial political discourse.
Daniela Preda changes perspectives, and proposes a re-reading of two important 
men for an integrated Europe, men who, in salient moments in the history of 
European integration, have proposed reﬂections and actions for the progress of the 
joint construction, fearful not only of possible external threats, but also of how a “non-
integration” was detrimental to Europe.
Maria Eleonora Guasconi investigates on the European eﬀorts to keep détente alive 
during the 1980’s, focusing in particular on the relations with the Soviet Union after the 
Single European Act (SEA) signature in 1986. Although the Single European Act was not 
originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues, as its main goal was to complete the 
Single market, it represented a signiﬁcant stage also for the development of a European 
foreign policy. For the ﬁrst time it included the scope of a common foreign policy, 
linking the EC procedures, in a single legal instrument to the EPC.  The article will deal 
with the issue of “consistency”, or, in other words, the increasing recourse made by EPC 
to EC instruments (and vice-versa) as sanctions or the use of conditionality in economic 
assistance, in order to further EC’s policies. In particular the article will investigate if 
the completion of the Single market and the revival of European integration in the 
second half of the 1980’s aﬀected USSR policy, wondering in particular if it inﬂuenced 
the development of Gorbachev’s project of a European common home.
Finally, Max Guderzo studies some nuances of “fear” in Eastern Europe traceable 
in US diplomatic correspondence and key decision-making documents produced 
during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, 1977-80. Washington’s perceptions, attitude 
and policies towards the region and its countries – including the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia 
and Albania – are observed against the backdrop of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in a phase of the Cold War heavily marked by the invasion 
of Afghanistan and by the ongoing threat of Soviet use of military force to restore 
Moscow’s full control over its Eastern European bloc.
Since historiography is slow in exploring the more speciﬁc aspects of the 
Eastern part, still favouring a Western reading, the articles aim above all to ﬁll this 
historiography gap. They are also meant to overcome the disciplinary limits, creating 
an interdisciplinary synergy that, by using diﬀerent methodologies, helps to return a 
three-dimensional picture of a long-term historical process that still generates crises 
and conﬂicts.
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